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Gheist Supply Chain Attack Weaponizes Stolen GitHub Tokens to Steal Cloud Secrets

An ongoing supply chain campaign dubbed "Gheist" is abusing stolen GitHub tokens to steal cloud secrets, according to Dark Reading. The operation is harvesting credentials and other sensitive data from thousands of developer repositories.

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A supply chain attack campaign tracked as "Gheist" is abusing stolen GitHub tokens to gain access to cloud secrets, according to Dark Reading. The outlet reports that the operation is ongoing and is harvesting credentials and other sensitive data from thousands of developer repositories.

Per Dark Reading's reporting, the campaign hinges on the misuse of GitHub access tokens — credentials commonly issued to developers, automation tools and continuous integration pipelines to interact with repositories. Once such tokens are captured, attackers can use them to reach code and configuration material stored in repositories, including secrets used to authenticate to cloud services. That, in turn, can open the door to broader compromise of cloud environments tied to the affected projects.

Because the technique targets the software development pipeline itself, the campaign is being characterized as a supply chain attack: rather than breaching end targets directly, the operation exploits the trusted tooling and credentials that developers rely on to build and ship software. Dark Reading's account indicates the campaign remains active and that the pool of affected repositories numbers in the thousands, suggesting a broad harvesting effort rather than a narrowly targeted intrusion.

The report highlights the continued risk posed by exposed or inadequately protected access tokens in developer environments. Details of the campaign, including its scope and methods, come from Dark Reading. In the material summarized here, the outlet's coverage did not name the operators behind Gheist or attribute the campaign to a specific threat actor.

Source: Dark Reading

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